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THE INTERACTING AREAS OF REGULATORY AUTHORITY IN PUBLIC UTILITIES
GUSTAVUS H. ROBINSON
The last few years show a constant enlargement of the
category of the business enterprises over which the Federal government exercises its regulatory authority. Since regulation
connotes that the regulator is bigger than the regulated, and the
regulated insists on vast size, business organization on national
scale causes the states, it seems necessarily, to lose power to an
authority which still continues larger than any of the enterprises
it deals with. It is the growth of Federal government activities, therefore, which marks the period generally. As to the
utility, the United States government entered the field of direct
control through the use of the Interstate Commerce Commission
in 1887. Originally confined to railroads, the jurisdiction of
that body has been expanded to cover other interstate communication; to pipe lines, express companies, sleeping car companies,
telegraph, telephone and cable companies. It might appear that
it is due to be the controller, for the Federal authority, of all
forms of communication or transportation. Yet radio matters,
and labor matters, even in the industries already in the Commerce
Commission's hands, have gone to special commissions. The
motor bus in interstate commerce must, have a Federal regulation, but whether it will be by the Commerce Commission is not
decided; the scheme for superpower transmission must expect
Federal regulation.' Logically it may bb better to have it all in
the hands of one body. Certainly it seems inadvisable to give
railroads and their rates to the Commerce Commission and not
give railroad wages to the same authority. But perhaps the
answer lies in a sense that the Commerce Commission is already
overburdened, and in a vague dread of surrendering to any one
' See

(1927)

4o HAxv. L. REv.

906, note to Attleboro, etc., Co. v. P. U.

CoMM., 273 U. S. 83 (1927).

(394)
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authority such vast powers. It appears likely, on the whole,
that the Interstate Commerce Commission is ceasing to be the
residuary legatee as to the new enterprises over which the Federal authority extends.
But although the Congressional trend to give the Commission jurisdiction over more enterprises may be checked, the extent of the Commission's authority over the types of utility to
which it has been applied has constantly been deepened. Since
the TransportationAct of 1920 the Interstate Commerce Commission holds the Federal mandate to view the railroads as a
unit serving as a unit the whole country and to treat them accordingly. This national view as interpreted by the Supreme
Court in the Wisconsin Passenger Fares case 2 frowns upon the
possibility that financially weak intrastate portions of the railroad business may draw sustenance from the interstate parts.
The Court there said:
"Congress in its control of the interstate commerce
system is seeking in the TransportationAct to make the system adequate to the needs of the country by securing for it
a reasonably compensatory return for all the work it does.
The states are seeking to use that same system for intra2

After briefly reviewing it in Railroad Commission of Wisconsin v. Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy R. R. Co. (Wisconsin Passenger Fares Cases) 257 U. S.
563 (1922), Chief Justice Taft says "It is manifest from this very condensed
recital that the act made a new departure. Theretofore the control which Congress, through the Interstate Commerce Commission, exercised, was primarily
for the purpose of preventing injustice by unreasonable or discriminatory rates
against persons and localities, and the only provisions of the law that inured to
the benefit of the carriers were the requirements that the rates should be reasonable in the sense of furnishing an adequate compensation for the particular
service rendered, and the abolition of rebates." See also Akron, Canton, etc.,
Ry. Co. v. United States (New England Divisions Case) 261 U. S.184 (1923).
Mr. Justice Brandeis in Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co., 27o
U. S. 266 (1926) says of the Transportation Act: "By that measure, Congress
undertook to develop and maintain, for the people of the United States, an adequate railway system. It recognized that preservation of the earning capacity,
and conservation of the financial resources, of individual carriers is a matter
of national concern; that the building of unnecessary lines involves a waste of
resources, and that the burden of this waste may fall upon the public; that
competition between carriers may result in harm to the public, as well as in
benefit; and that, when a railroad inflicts injury upon its rival, it may be the
public which ultimately bears the loss. See also Railroad Commission v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co., 257 U. S. 563 (1922); The New England
Divisions Case, 261 U. S.184 (1923); The Chicago Junction Case, 264 U. S.
258 (1924) ; Railroad Commission v. Southern Pacific Co., 264 U. S.331 (1924).
The Act sought, among other things, to avert such losses."
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state traffic. That entails large duties and expenditures on
the interstate commerce system which may burden it unless
compensation is received for the intrastate business reasonably proportionate to that for the interstate business. Congress, as dominant controller of interstate commerce, may,
therefore, restrain undue limitation of the earning power
of the interstate commerce system in doing state work. The
affirmative power of Congress in developing interstate commerce agencies is clear. In such development, it can impose
any reasonable condition on a state's use of interstate carriers for intrastate commerce it deems necessary or desirable. This is because of the supremacy of the national
power in this field."
The discussion which follows aims to show what effect the
new background thus set forth has had upon the State and Federal areas of regulatory authority.
The earlier doctrine which gives to the Interstate Commerce
Commission an authority over intrastate rates when they operate to work discrimination against interstate commerce is now
well known.3 It was startling enough in its day, but it involved
'Houston and E. & W. Texas Ry. Co. v. U. S. (Shreveport Rate Cases) 234

U. S. 34. (194). "Undoubtedly-in the absence of a finding by the Commission

of unjust discrimination-intrastate rates were left to be fixed by the carrier
and subject to the authority of the States or of the agencies created by the
States. This was the question recently decided by this court in the Minnesota
Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352 (913).

There, the state of Minnesota had estab-

lished reasonable rates for intrastate transportation throughout the State and it
was contended that, by reason of the passage of the Act to Regulate Commerce,
the state could no longer exercise the state-wide authority for this purpose
which it had formerly enjoyed; and the court was asked to hold that an entire
scheme of intrastate rates, otherwise validly established, was null and void
because of its effect upon interstate rates. There had been no finding by the
Interstate Commerce Commission of any unjust discrimination.
"Here, the Commission expressly found that unjust discrimination existed
under substantially similar conditions of transportation and the inquiry is whether
the Commission had power to correct it. We are of the opinion that the limitation of the proviso in section one does not apply to a case of this sort. This is
plainly the case when the Commission finds that unjust discrimination against
interstate trade arises from the relation of intrastate to interstate rates as
maintained by a carrier subject to the act. Such a matter is one with which
Congress alone is competent to deal, and, in view of the aim of the act and the
comprehensive terms of the provisions against unjust discrimination, there is no
ground for holding that the authority of Congress was unexercised and that the
subject was thus left without governmental regulation. We are convinced that
the authority of the Commission was adequate."
The case has a considerable literature of its own. See the effect of the
Shreveport Rate Cases categorically stated in a confirming decision in Illinois
Central R. R. v. P. U. Commission of Ill., 245 U. S. 493 (1i8), at 506-7 and
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no such upsetting of what had been the formula, namely, that
interstate matters were for the Commerce Commission and intrastate matters for the states, as did the Wisconsin Passenger
Fares case 4 in 1922, for in the latter instance the whole intrastate rate structure was affected by the Federal Commission's
order. That body
"had investigated the interstate rates of carriers in the
United States, in a proceeding known as Ex parte 74, Increased Rates,5 for the purpose of complying with Section
I5a of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended by Section 422 of the TransportationAct of 192o.6 That section
requires that the Commission so adjust rates that the revenues of the carriers shall enable them as a whole or -by
groups to earn a fixed net income on their railway property. The Commission ordered an increase for the carriers in the group of which the Wisconsin carriers were a
part. The Wisconsin Railroad Commission then granted increases in intrastate freight rates but denied any in intrastate passenger fares on the sole ground that a state statute prescribed a two-cent maximum.
"Since all of the carriers transported both intrastate
and interstafe passengers on the same train, with the same
service and accommodations, the findings of the Commerce
Commission were that there was undue . . . discrimina-

tion against persons traveling in interstate commerce and
against interstate commerce as a whole; and ordered that
the undue discrimination be removed by increases in all intrastate fares . . . corresponding with the increases . .

ordered in interstate business."
The joyful carriers filed bills in equity to enjoin the state
commission from interfering with this bounty and the case came
notes to this case (1918) 16 MICH. L. REv. 379; (1918) 18 COL L. REaV. 270;
(1918) 31 HARV. L. REv. lO31. Notes on Shreveport Case, (192I) 69 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 262; (1914) 14 CoL L. REv. 583; (1914) 28 HARV. L. REv. 113. See H.
W. Bikl, Federal Control of IntrastateRailroadRates (1914) 63 U. OF PA. L.

REv. 69.

"R. R. Comm. of Wisc. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co., 257 U. S. 563
A "charter contract," between the state and the railroad, for a two
cents per mile passenger fare furnishes no vehicle for the avoidance of the
Commission's order: New York v. U. S., 257 U. S. 591 (1922).
o 58 Interst. Com. Rep. 220 (I92o).
'41 Stat. 488 (I92O).
(1922).
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to the Supreme Court from a decision in their favor. In affirming it Chief Justice Taft, who wrote for a unanimous court,
pointed out at once that
"The order in this case, however, is much wider than
the orders made in the proceedings following the Shreveport
and Illinois C. R. Co. cases. There, as here, the report of
the Commission showed discrimination against persons and
localities at border points, and the orders were extended to
include all rates or fares from all points in the state to border points. But this order is not so restricted. ,It includes
fares between all interior points, although neither may be
near the border, and the fares between them may not work
a discrimination against interstate travelers at all. Nothing in the precedents cited justifies an order affecting all
rates of a general description. .
We cannot sustain
the sweep of the order in this case on the showing of discriminations against persons or places alone.
"The report of the Commission shows that if the intrastate passenger fares in Wisconsin are to be limited . . .
to two cents per mile, .

.

. the net income of the interstate

carriers of the state will be cut six millions of dollars below what it would be under intrastate rates on the same
level with interstate rates.
"Under title 4 (of the 192o Act) amendments were
made to the Interstate Commerce Act which included Section 13, pars. 3 and 4, and Section ISa. The former for
the first time authorizes the Commission to deal with intrastate rates where they are unduly discriminating against
interstate commerce,-a power already indirectly exercised
as to persons and localities, with approval of this court, in
the Shreveport and other cases. The latter, the most novel
and most important feature of the Act, requires the Commission so to prescribe rates as to enable the carriers as
a whole, or in groups selected by the Commission, to earn
an aggregate annual net railway operating income equal to
a fair return on the aggregate value of the railway property
used in transportation..

"

The new measure imposed an affirmative duty on the Interstate Commerce Commission to fix rates and to maintain an adequate service for the people of the United States. This is expressly declared in Section I5a to be one of the purposes of the
bill.
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"Intrastate rates and the income from them must play
a most important part in maintaining an adequate national
railway system. Twenty per cent. of the gross freight receipts of the railroads of the country are from intrastate
traffic, and fifty per cent. of the passenger receipts ...
If the railways are to earn a fixed net percentage of income,
the lower the intrastate rates, the higher the interstate rates
may have to be. The effective operation of the Act will reasonably and justly require that intrastate traffic should pay
a fair proportionate share of the cost of maintaining an
adequate railway system.
"When we turn to par. 4, Section 13, [we] find the
Commission for the first time vested with a direct power to
remove 'any undue, unreasonable, or unjust discrimination
against interstate or foreign commerce,' [and] it is impossible to escape the dovetail relation between that provision
and the purpose of Section I5a. If that purpose is interfered with by a disparity of intrastate rates, the Commission is authorized to end the disparity by directly removing
it, because it is plainly an 'undue, unreasonable, and unjust
discrimination against interstate or foreign commerce,'
within the ordinary meaning of those words." 7
Municipal .pride urging a monumental union station was
checked in The Railroad Commission of California v. Southern
Pacific Railway, et al.,8 when the state commission's order for
one at Los Angeles was upset because it involved an outlay of
$25,ooo,ooo to $45,000,000. Such extended capital expendi'The decision was widely commented upon. See note to the case: (1922)
35 H v. L. REv. 864; (1923) 36 HBAv. L. REv. 14; (1922) 2 Wis. L. REv.
56; (1922) 2o MicH. L. REv. 675; (1922) 6 MINN. L. R-v. 675; (1922)
8 VA. L. REv. 615; McCallester, (1922) 31 YALE L. J. 870-9; James M.
Beck, Federal Power over Intrastate Railroad Rates, (1922) 71 U. oP PA. L.
REV.

i;

T. R. Powell, The Supreme Court Decisions on the Commercel

Clause and State Police Powers, (1921) 21 Co.. L. REV. 737; (1922) 22
Coi. L. REV.. 28; and The Supreme Court's Adjudication of Constitutional
ISSues it 1921, 1922, (1922) 21 MicH. L. REv. 174, 177. In 1924 after the
decision of Dayton Goose Creek Ry. v. United States (The Recapture of
Earnings Cases) 263 U. S. 456 (1924), a writer in (0924) 37 -ARv. L. REv.
888, heads his note, "The waning power of the states over railroads: curtailment of state regulatory activities by the Transportation Act" and concludes,
"Although it is too early to observe the complete effect of the Act upon

the States' police power, it is clear already that it has achieved a single,
nationally-minded regulation of the larger phases of transportation. State
regulation is now decidedly confined to matters of routine administration requiring a knowledge of conditions peculiarly local."
a264 U. S. 331 (1924).
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tures on state say-so were held to be outside the state jurisdiction. Said Chief Justice Taft:
"It is obvious from the foregoing (analysis of the 1920
Act) that Congress intended to place under the superintending and fostering direction of the Interstate Commerce Commission all increased facilities in the matter of distribution
of cars and equipment and in joint terminals in the exchange
of interstate traffic and passengers between railways so as
to make it prompt and continuous. It not only provides for
the temporary expropriation of terminals and main track
of one railway to the common use of one or more other
railways in an emergency, but it also contemplates the compulsory sharing of one company's terminals with one or
more companies as a permanent arrangement. This is a
drastic limitation 6f a carrier's control and use of its own
property in order to secure convenience and dispatch for the
whole shipping and traveling public in interstate commerce.
It gives to the Interstate Commerce Commission the power
and duty, where the public interest requires, to make out of
what is the passenger and freight station of one interstate
carrier, a union station or depot.
"We think it clear that in such an extension of main
lines with their terminals the Interstate Commerce Commission is required by the Act to make a finding that the expense
involved will not impair the ability of the carriers concerned
to perform their duty to the public. (As required by Section 4o2, par. 2 1.)

"Until the Interstate Commerce Commission shall have
acted under paragraphs 18 to 21 of Section 4o2 of the
TransportationAct,9 the respondent railways can not be reThe requirement was added by the Transportation Act of 1920, §§ 18-20.
See Texas v. E. Texas R. Co., 258 U. S. 204 (1922), Mr. Justice VanDevanter:
"By sec. 402 of the Transportation Act of 1920, c. 91, 41 Stat. 456, 477, several
new paragraphs were added to sec. i of the Act to Regulate Commerce as theretofore amended. By them Congress has undertaken to regulate the construction
and acquisition of new or additional lines of railroad and the extension and
abandonment of old lines, and to invest the Interstate Commerce Commission
with important administrative powers in that connection ...
"They declare that 'no carrier by railroad subject to this act shall abandon
all or any portion of a line of railroad, or the operation thereof, unless and until
there shall first have been obtained from the Commission a certificate that the
present or future public convenience and necessity permit of such abandonment' (par. 18) ; that when applicatioii for such a certificate is received the
Commission shall cause notice thereof to be given to the Governor of the State
wherein the line lies and publish in newspapers of general circulation in each
county along the line, and shall accord a hearing to the State and all parties in
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quired to provide a new interstate union station and to extend their main tracks thereto as ordered by the State Railroad Commission."
In Colorado v. United States,'0 the decision upholding an
order that an anemic intrastate branch of an interstate road
should no longer draw sustinence from the general system was
another phase of the unity idea applied to finances. The court
said, by Brandeis, J.:
"Control is exerted over intrastate commerce only because such control is a necessary incident of freeing interstate commerce from the unreasonable burdens, obstruction
or unjust discrimination which are found to result from
operating a branch at a large loss. .

.

. The exertion of the

federal power to prevent prejudice to interstate commerce so arising . . . is similar to that exerted when a

state establishes intrastate rates so low that intrastate traffic
does not bear its fair share of the cost of the service, .
or when state authorities seek to compel the erection of a
union station so expensive as unduly to deplete the financial resources of the carriers, . . . or when one road seeks

to construct an intrastate branch which would do so..

.

interest (par. ig); that the Commission may grant or refuse the certificate in
whole or in part and impose such terms and conditions as in its judgment the
public convenience and necessity require; and that when the certificate is issued,
and not before, the carrier may, 'without securing approval other than such certificate,' comply with the terms and conditions imposed and proceed with the
abandonment covered by the certificate (par. 2o)."
The distinction between "extensions" and "spurs" is being worked out by
the Supreme Court: Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Gulf C., & S. F. Ry., 27o U. S. 266
(x926), "where the proposed trackage extends into new territory not heretofore served by the carrier, and particularly when it extends into territory already
served by another carrier, its purpose and effect are under the new policy of
Congress of national concern," said Brandeis,' J.

See note (1926) 39 HAv. L.

REv. 753. See also Alabama & V. Ry. Co. v. Jackson & E. Ry. Co., 271 U. S.
244 (1926) discussed infra. For a discussion of the Commissionds reading of
the statute to require that its certificate issue in cases where a new company
seeks to operate old lines, see L T. Swaine, Reorganization of Corporations
(1928) 28 CoL L. REV. 29, 37.
The new act also gives the Interstate Commerce Commission the supervision of new issues of capital securities. The probability that they would be
required to finance the Los Angeles project was a distinct make weight against
the state. See Wanitng Power of the States over Railroads (i924) 37 HARV.
L. Rxv. 888; and on the 192o Act to 1922 a note in (1922) 2 Wis. L. REV. 56;
and E. C. Buckland, Three Years of the TransportationAct, (1023) 32 YALE
L. 3. 658.
10271 U. S. 153 (1926).
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Against such a background as that just indicated, a recent
decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
offers elements of surprise. In Texas and New Orleans Ry. v.
Northside Belt Ry.," the Texas and New Orleans sought to
block the construction of the projected Northside road which
contemplated doing a half and half interstate and intrastate
business and which had made no application to the Interstate
Commerce Commission for a certificate of convenience. The
District Court held that until a new road is actually undertaking
to do interstate business the Commerce Commission is without
jurisdiction. It dismissed the bill without prejudice to an application later if the future activities "shall bring it over properly
within the purview of the act." This decree was affirmed by
the Circuit Court of Appeals, but it seems a matter of no astonishment 12 that the Supreme Court has granted a writ of certiorari,13
Both the Commerce Commission's own view and that of an
interested state is against the holding in the Fifth Circuit, as
was evidenced when the Illinois Central Railroad proposed to
construct new lines in Illinois for the diversion of general interstate and intrastate traffic. It applied beforehand to the Federal
Commission which made no doubt of its jurisdiction to deal with
the matter, though then merely in a state of contemplation. The
litigation is set forth in People v. Illinois Central Ry.,"4 wherein
certain interested persons sought by suit in the state courts to
enjoin the construction of the lines. Said the Supreme Court
of Illinois: "The question of the jurisdiction of a state court to
grant the relief

.

.

.

lies at the threshold."

It recited the provisions of the I92o Act and the holdings
of Federal courts, and ordered the dismissal of the bill, saying:
. . . the Southern Illinois and Kentucky Railroad
Company will be an interstate carrier. .

.

. The Interstate

Commerce Commission found, among other things, that
"8 F.(2d) 153 (1925); I6 F.(2d) 782

(1927).

The decision is criticised in note in (1925) 39 HARv.L. REv. 753.
'47 Sup. Ct. 768 (1927).
it324 IlM. 591, 155 N. E. 841 (1927).
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the public convenience and necessity required the construction of the cutoff .

.

. [and] granted the requisite per-

mission and authority for these purposes. The appellees,
by the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act, have
the right to do these things without seeking any further
authority. If, as the result of the instant suit, the construction of the cut-off should be enjoined, then a conflict of jurisdiction between the Commission and the state court would
necessarily arise, for what was affirmed by one would be
denied by the other. In such a situation the power to determine whether state action will obstruct interstate commerce inheres in the United States as an incident of its
power to regulate such commerce."
The sense of unity may be taking the tinge of transportation unity rather than merely of railroad unity. In United States
v. New York Central Railroad,' the Supreme Court sustained
over the heads of the District Court of three judges, an order of
the Federal Commission linking the New York Barge Canal with
the railroad by interchange of traffic. The lower court felt that
the State was disqualified to apply for the order because not itself
a common carrier. 16 Stone, J., said:
"A state when its interests are concerned, as well as
a private individual, whether carrier or not may file a- complaint with the Commission. The Commission having jurisdiction over the carriers and facilities by which the transportation is carried on, the question is narrowed as to
whether its jurisdiction extends to the entire current of
commerce flowing through the terminal, although intrastate in part."
In another place he says:
"About seventy-five per cent. of the traffic passing over
it (the canal) is interstate."
:272 U. S. 457 (1926).
a' The state does not own barges or rolling stock; nor does it transport
merchandise or operate the canal, the court explained. The order [13 F.(2d)
200 (1925) ] directed the railroad to provide and maintain a transportation service
between the state's Canal Basin and points on its own connecting lines . . .
and perform the operating service necessary . . . "with its own motive power"
and employees, making it thus the instrument to divert traffic from its own lines
to the canal.
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In another waterway case, Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific
Railroad Company v. United States,1 the railroad failed to enjoin enforcement of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission which prescribed joint rail and water rates on cotton
from Oklahoma points to New England ports. Said Mr. Justice
Sutherland for the Court:
"Clearly the order in this respect can be sustained under
the later and broader provisions of paragraph 13 of section
6, added to the Interstate Commerce Act by the Panama
Canal Act.
"This addition to the Interstate Commerce Act materially extends the jurisdiction of the Commission in respect
of land and water transportation and the carriers engaged
in it, whenever property may be or is transported in interstate commerce by rail and water by a common carrier or
carriers; and the obvious intention of Congress would be
substantially limited in effect if the quoted provisions were
held to be subject to the restriction that both rail and water
must be used under a common control, etc. The phrase,
'except where one of the carriers is a water line', was introduced in an amendment made to the Interstate Commerce
Act by the TransportationAct, 192o, and it is not unreasonable to include within the scope of its reference, the then
existing paragraph 13 of section 6. And this view is
strengthened by the consideration that the Transportation
Act, 192o, as a part of the new policy which it introduced.
in respect of the regulation of interstate transportation
(Wisconsin R. R. Comm. v. C. B. & Q. R. R. Co., 257
U. S. 563 [1922]; New England Divisions Case [supra

note 21 at 189), directed the Commission to establish
through routes, joint classifications, etc., both in respect
of railroad and water carriers, 'whenever deemed by it to
be necessary or desirable in the public interest,' etc. (41
Stat. 485.) And the same act declares it to be 'the policy
of Congress to promote, encourage, and develop water transportation, service, and facilities in connection with the commerce of the United States, and to foster and preseive in
full vigor both rail and water transportation.' Section
500, 41 Stat. 490 (Comp. St. §-IOO7i4k.)

"These and other provisions emphasize the intention of
1274 U. S. 29 (1927).
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Congress to broaden the control of the Interstate Commerce Commission over rail and water transportation and
generally to extend the regulatory power of that body over
all such transportation in the public interest. It would be
quite inconsistent with that broad purpose to adopt the
narrow construction of the statutory provisions under review which is advanced by the appellants."
The implications of the Wisconsin Passenger Fares case
may result in the ultimate unprofitableness of the game of hideand-seek in Federal against state rates or vice versa. Variances in the rates have tempted the railroad users to secure a
label best suited to their interests and have furnished suits so
close on their facts that each new one is apparently worth gambling on. The present freight rates which make the game still
possible raise the suggestion that as to them, too, there is a possible invitation to the action of the Commerce Commission. Certainly the intrastate freight structure may not work detriment to
the general freight rate fabric, either.
The language as to the "law" governing the situation is not
intricate, and has been restated recently in Baltimore and Ohio
S. W. Ry. v. Settle,' where Settle sought the benefit of the
Ohio rate from Oakley, Ohio, to Madisonville, Ohio (both
freight stations within the city of Cincinnati) on shipments
from outside the state which were billed in to Oakley. At Oakley, Settle received the cars and, without unloading and in a few
days, reshipped them from Oakley to Madisonville where his factory was. His object was the saving to him on the interstate
rate from origin to Oakley, plus the Ohio rate from Oakley to
Madisonville-which items he paid-over the interstate rate
throughout to Madisonville. He failed to attain it. The carrier's suit for the difference was successful. Speaking for the
court, Mr. Justice Brandeis said:
"The rights of the shipper against the carrier are determined by law through the provisions of the tariff which
are embodied in the applicable published rate. And whether
The case is noted (1923) 23 COL. L. REv. 308;
36 HARv. L. Rv. 339; and in (1923) 71 U. OF PA. L. REv. 132 on the
shipper's intention as the determining factor.
26o U. S. 166 (1922).

(1923)
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the interstate or the intrastate tariff is applicable depends
upon the essential character of the movement. That the
contract between the shipper and carrier does not necessarily
determine the character was settled by a series of cases
in which the subject received much consideration.' 9 And in
Baer Brothers Mercantile Co. v. Denver and Rio Grande
R. R. Co., 233 U. S. 479, 49 o , this Court held that a car-

rier cannot, by separating the rate into its component parts,
charging local rates and issuing local waybills, convert an
interstate shipment into intrastate transportation, and
thereby deprive a shipper of the benefit of an appropriate
rate for a through interstate movement.
"If the intention with which the shipment was made
had been actually in issue, the fact that possession of the cars
was taken by the shipper at Oakley and that they were not
rebilled for several days, would have justified the jury in
finding that it was originally the intention to end the movement at Oakley and that the rebilling to Madisonville was
an afterthought. But the defendant Clephane admitted at
the trial that it was intended from the beginning that the
cars should go to Madisonville, . . . [which] was at all

times the destination of the cars; Oakley was to be merely
an intermediate stopping place; and the original intention
persisted in was carried out. That the interstate journey
might end at Oakley was never more than a possibility.
Under these circumstances, the intention as it was carried
out determined, as matter of law, the essential nature of
the movement; and hence that the movement through to
Madisonville was an interstate shipment. For neither
through billing, uninterrupted movement, continuous possession by the carrier, nor unbroken bulk, is an essential of
a through interstate shipment."
The Standard Oil Company has found the question worth
litigating in a series of cases dealing with its methods for importing gasoline, oil, etc., into a state and feeding it into its
amazingly effective apparatus of local distribution. In North
Carolina it fought for the state rate for its distribution within
North Carolina of oil which it brought from other states, in
"Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219
U. S. 498 (1)
Ohio Railroad Commission v. Worthington, 225 U. S. 01
(1912); Texas & New Orleans R. R. Co. v. Sabine Tram Co., 227 U. S. III
(1913) ; Railroad Commission v. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co., 229 U. S. 336 (1913).
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tankers to Wilmington, where they were discharged into immense
storage tanks, whence distribution was made, partly by wagon,
and partly by rail in tank cars to North Carolina points. It sought
to enjoin the railroads from charging the interstate tariff on these
tank cars. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. Atlantic Coast
Line Ry., 20 records its victory in the District Court of North
Carolina which it retained in the Circuit Court of Appeals, 4th
Circuit. 21 In October, 1926, the Supreme Court denied a peti22
tion for a writ of certiorari.

The District Court after reviewing the cases proceeded to a
conclusion that on the facts the shipments
"reached a physical rest at Wilmington, a place of storage
for distribution in a new commerce within the state . . .
for the avowed and admitted purpose of ultimate reshipment by distinct and separate consignments over new carriers not to one point only and to a particular place of business of the complainant, but to. many places of local distribution,"
distinguishing the Settle case. Of this the Circuit Court of
Appeals which also wrote a review of the cases, said: "We concur in the conclusion reached."
The Company put the same problem before the Kentucky
District Court in Standard Oil Co. of Ky. v. Atlantic Coast Line
R. R. Co., 23 as to its distribution in Florida from its storage
tanks in Port Tampa and Jacksonville. It won a complete initial
24
success, but the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Sixth Circuit,
undertook to differentiate the oils in a manner which apparently
was not presented to the North Carolina court and the victory
of the Standard was modified. The Circuit Court in this latter
case asked, substantially, what oil was for general and what for
special distribution and granted the intrastate rate from the pri116 F.(2d) '9n (ig25). Noted "When does stoppage break the continuity
of interstate shipment?" (1926) 74 U. oF PA. L. REV.390.
21

2F.(2d) 54I (1926).

2272

U. S.69i (1926).

13 F.(2d) 633 (1926).
M
I6 F.(2d) 441 (1926).
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mary tank, only to the former oil.
said:

As to the latter oil the court

"This is substantially all sold by the Company to various manufacturers-the ultimate users-upon annual con-

tracts to supply them with stated quantities or with their
needs during the period. . . . In our judgment this oil
travels on a substantially continuous trip . . . to the inte-

rior points in Florida, and the Port Tampa tanks are a pond
or equalizing reservoir"

as were the Stockyards, the court goes on to say, in Stafford v.
Wallace,25 which held the cattle in them to be still in interstate
traffic and subject to Federal supervision. 26 It therefore applied
the interstate rate to the whole transit of this oil. The court
treated the oil which went through the Port Tampa tanks and was

intended for the company's bulk station in the same way, saying:
"It is the latter not the former which are the company's points of
distribution for public use." 27 Thus, only oil uncontracted for,
25258

U. S. 495 (1922).

'See Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921, (1922) 22 COL. L. REv. 68.
2 The Court at this point remarked: "We do not intend to say that these
(contract and bulk station) oils may not be subject to state taxation at Port
Tampa; that question is not involved."
In another aspect, since the oil was going out of Texas, rather than into the
state, it was, however, directly raised in City of Galveston v. Mexican Petroleum
Corp., 15 Fed. (2d) 2o8 (S. D. Tex. 1926). Oil was brought to Galveston in
tankers from Mexico and from Galveston distributed under prior contract to
interstate buyers outside Galveston with a few spot sales there. The court held
the oil not taxable by Galveston. "I cannot give my assent to the view of the
Supreme Court of Maine in Mexican Petroleum Company v. Portland, 121 Me.
128 (1922), that the tanker is the original package in the sense of the constitutional question," said Hutcheson, D. J. See note (1927) II MINN. L. Rav. 368.
In Gulf Refining Co. v. Phillips Tax Collector, ii F.(2d) 967 (1926), the
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, held valid a tax by the Louisiana parish
in which the tanks were located. It appears that to them was brought oil from
Arkansas on its way to refineries in Texas. It found that the collection of the
oil in Louisiana was an intentional detention for the beneficial purposes of the
owner (to select the fresher oil for refining as fresh oil gives more gasoline)
within Champlain Co. v. Brattleboro, 26o U. S. 366 (1922).
In Hughes Bros. Timber Co. v. Minneapolis, 272 U. S. 469 (1926), the
State sued to collect taxes as of May I on certain pulp wood and was resisted
on the assertion that the wood was in transit in interstate commerce. The wood
was cut in various places in Minnesota, hauled to the Swamp River and piled
upon its banks near the Pigeon, and at the confluence with the Pigeon delivered
under a contract with a Michigan paper company from the booms there to vessels sent by the latter for transfer to its mills. The collection on the banks
ended in March and the logs were started on April 29th when the ice broke
and i8 days consumed in getting them to the booms. The last of them were
shipped by late July. In upsetting the state court which sustained the tax, Taft,
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and oil for stations which distribute directly to the consumers
secured the intrastate rates.
The narrowness of the distinctions no doubt adds zest to such
litigation, for the Standard Oil Company and the railroad both
secured writs of certiorari, and, in Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co.
v. Standard Oil Co.,ara Chief Justice Taft, for the court, upset the
differentiation and wholly affirmed the District Court, saying:
"It seems very clear to us on a broad view of the facts
that the interstate or foreign commerce in all this oil ends
upon its delivery to the plaintiff into the storage tanks or the
storage tank cars at the seaboard, and that from there its
distribution to storage tanks, tank cars, bulk stations and
drive-in stations, or directly by tank wagons to customers, is
all intrastate commerce. This distribution is the whole business of the plaintiff in Florida. There is no destination intended and arranged for with the ship carriers in Florida at
any point beyond the deliveries from the vessels to the storage
tanks or tank cars of the plaintiff. There is no designation
of any particular oil for any particular place within Florida
beyond the storage receptacles or storage tank cars into which
the oil is first delivered by the ships. The title to the oil in
bulk passes to the plaintiff as it is thus delivered. When the
oil reaches these storage *placesalong the Florida seaboard, it
is within the control and ownership of the plaintiff for use
for its particular purposes in Florida.: The plaintiff is free
to distribute the oil according to the demands of its business,
and it arranges its storage capacity to meet the future variation in its business needs at Tampa, Port Tampa, or Jacksonville, or St. Johns River terminal.
"The important controlling fact in the present controversy, and what characterizes the nature of the commerce
involved, is that the plaintiff's whole plan is to arrange deliveries of all of its oil purchases on the seaboard of Florida so
that they may all be there stored for convenient distribution
in the state to the 123 bulk stations and to fuel oil plants in
varying quantities according to the demand of the plaintiff's
C. J., said: "The change in the method of transportation by floating to carriage

on a vessel did not affect the continuity of the interstate passage, if such a
passage was intended by the parties and had begun, any more than did shipment
by local railroad bills of lading from a point in a state to a port of the same
state, for shipment by vessel to a foreign port, prevent its being interstate or
foreign commerce."
21&48

Sup. Ct. iO7 (1927).
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customers, and thence be distributed to subordinate centers
and delivery stations, and this plan is being carried out daily.
There is neither necessity nor purpose to send the oil through
these seaboard storage stations to interior points by immediate continuity of transportation. The seaboard storage stations are the natural places for a change from interstate and
foreign transportation to that which is intrastate, and there
is nothing in the history of the whole transaction which
makes them otherwise, either in intent or in fact." 28
It specifically approved the result reached by the State court
in directing, in mandamus proceedings, compliance with the tariffs
for the Florida hauls as prescribed by the Florida Commission:
State ex rel. Burr v. A. C. L. R.

Co.

2

s

The Supreme Court also said: "We concur in the reasoning
and conclusions of the United States circuit court of appeals for
the fourth circuit, in Atlantic Coat Line R. Co. v. Standard Oil
Co., 12 F. 2d 541."

Whether interstate or state rates were to be applied was
again before the District Court of North Carolina in Seaboard
Air Line Ry., et al. v. Lee, et al.,29 where the carrier sought to
enjoin the North Carolina Corporation Commission from enforcing its order to apply intrastate rates on nitrate from Wilmington, N. C., to interior points in the state. The port to which the
cargo is destined is not indicated until the vessels, which come
from Chile, reach the Panama Canal and is then determined by
the stocks on hand and demands at various Atlantic ports. If
2' The court said: "The case is like that of General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209
U. S. 211, in which the General Oil Company sought an injunction against the
collection of a tax for the inspection of certain of its oils in Tennessee, which it
had brought into Tennessee and stored in tanks, and marked in storage tanks
as oil already sold in Arkansas, Louisiana and Mississippi, and which remained
in Tennessee only long enough to be properly distributed according to the orders
therefor, and other oil in other t aks marked to be sold in those states but for
which no orders at the time of shipment from the manufacturing plants had been
received. This court held that the Tennessee tax was not a burden on interstate commerce as applied to oil coming from certain states though ultimately
intended for sale and distribution in states other than Tennessee; that the oil
was subject to a tax while it was being stored in Tennessee for convenience of
distribution and for reshipping in tank cars and barrels; that this was business
done in Tennessee, where the oil was brought to rest, and was for a purpose
outside its mere transportation."
l9 So. 656 (1926).
10
'14 F.(2d) 439 (1926). Noted in (927) 5 N. C. L. REv. 355.
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Wilmington is designated, the bags are there landed and. delivered at the dock to the importer who marks for his customers
and delivers to Heide and Co., a common agent for them. About
8o per cent. is reshipped from shipside to these purchasers within
the state and they pay the freight for this haul. The District
Court of three judges denied an injunction.
Judge Meekins, who wrote the opinion in the Standard Oil
case,2 0 here answered the question "Whose intention governs?"
He said:
"The essential character of the commerce is to be determined . . . by the original and persisting intention of the

shipper, using that term in the sense of him for whose benefit the shipment is made, or, as it is sometimes expressed, by
the intention of the shipper, which is carried out.
"It is entirely clear that, at the time a cargo of nitrate
starts from Chile, the importer has no intention that its
ultimate destination shall be an interior point in the state.
Indeed, it is unknown at such time to which port of entry
the vessel will proceed. The importer knows, of course,
that . . . a cargo, or a large part thereof, consigned to

Wilmington, will ultimately find its way, in segregated lots,
to the manufacturers and the agriculturists located in the
trade territory of that port. He knows further, of course,
that interior movements of the products must proceed by
rail from Wilmington. But this is very different from
saying that he intends, at the time of consigning a cargo
to Wilmington, to reship it from that point in mere continuation of the original movement from Chile.
"On the other hand, the record conclusively shows that
his intention is fully carried out, and his purposes fully subserved, when the cargo is delivered to him at Wilmington. .

.

. As aforesaid, his contracts call uniformly for

delivery at Wilmington. Why, then, should he make shipment to an interior point in the state? Manifestly the sole
result of so doing would be to require a reshipment to the
port before delivery could be enforced.
"It is insisted, however, that the importer could as
readily make contracts calling for delivery at interior points.
This may or may not be true. In any event, there is no
legal requirement that he do so. The record carries no sug"Supra note 20.
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gestion that the method of shipment and dealing described
is fraudulently resorted to or otherwise adopted in order to
defeat the application of the interstate rate."
The trend toward uniformity heretofore remarked on is
evidenced in the Federal Supreme Court's reversal of the Arkansas Court in Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Porter.8 ' The Missouri
Pacific received in Arkansas cotton for which it issued an export
bill of lading in two parts, of which the first part covered the
Arkansas-Brunswick, Georgia, rail haul; the second the Brunswick-England ocean haul by vessels operating under the British
flag. As applicable to the first part it stipulated exemption from
loss by fire, which, though permissible if Federal law governed, 3 2
was specifically invalidated by Arkansas statutes. These Arkansas statutes, however, the Arkansas court applied, on the theory
that the Interstate Commerce Act did not cover the particular
transit. 8 8
In Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Porter,3 4 Mr. Justice Butler, for
the court, decided that the Arkansas statute could not be applied.
He said:
"Section 25, added by the amendment of February 28,
1920, 41 Stat. 497, § 441 (Comp. St. § 8596a), was en-

acted to promote the business of common carriers by water
in foreign commerce whose vessels are registered under the
laws of the United States; it applies to shipments from
points in the United States to nonadjacent foreign countries and requires the commission to do certain things in
furtherance and regulation thereof. Subdivision 4 of that
31168 Ark. 22, 269 S. W. 47 (1925) ; Wolff and Co. v. Missouri, Kansas and
Texas Ry., 289 S. W. iooo (1927), is a similar case on the facts with the exception that the haul originated in Texas and the ocean port was Galveston. The
Texas court gave judgment for the plaintiff.
" Cau v. Texas Pacific Ry., 194 U. S. 427 (I9O4).
'It read the Acts of Congress regulating bills of lading to apply only to
interstate commerce, and to shipments from the United States to adjacent foreign countries. This seems proper enough, for the language of the statutes which
empower the Commerce Commission to regulate bills of lading read "point in
United States to an adjacent foreign territory," 38 STAT. 1197. In 1920, 41
STAT. 4, extended the regulation to shipments to non-adjacent foreign territory
when made in a vessel of United States registry. It is not clear that the Arkansas court ruled on this last, but the ship here was foreign.
" 273 U. S. 341 (1927).
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section requires a railroad carrier receiving a shipment to be
delivered to such a vessel for further transportation to issue
a through bill of lading which shall state separately the
amount to be paid for railroad transportation, for water
transportation and in addition, if any, for port charges. It
requires the railroad as a part -of its undertaking'to deliver
the shipment to the vessel and provides that it will not be
responsible after such delivery. The commission is expressly
empowered, in such manner as will preserve for the carrier
by water the protection of limited liability provided by law,
to prescribe the form of such bills of lading. The section
does not apply to shipments in such commerce where the
ocean carriage is by a foreign vessel. The record does not
disclose whether the vessel on which the cotton was to have
been carried was registered under the laws of the United
States; and, in favor of the shippers, we assume it was a
foreign vessel.
"The question is whether Congress has entered upon the
regulation of provisions in bills of lading affecting liability
of railroads for loss of property received by them for transportation over an interstate inland route to a seaport for delivery to a foreign vessel for ocean carriage to a nonadjacent
foreign country. . . . No act of Congress or order of the
commission prescribed a form of bill of lading for this
shipment. . . . The defendants-in-error rightly say that
the Carmack Amendment, the Cummins Amendment, or
section 25 does not apply to such a shipment. But that does
not sustain their contention that Congress has not evinced
an intention to regulate bills of lading for transportation
such as is here involved. Section I (6) extends to all carriers and .to all transportation subject to the act; it prescribes a general rule applicable to all regulations and practices affecting the form or substance of bills of lading in
order that they may be just and reasonable. And the Commission is empowered and directed to enforce the rule.
"The general regulation of the 'issuance, form, and
substance' of bills of lading is broad enough to cover contractual provisions, like the one involved in this case, exempting railroads from liability for loss of shippers' property by fire. Congress must be deemed to have determined
that the rule laid down and the means provided to enforce
it are sufficient and that no other regulation is necessary.
Its power to regulate such commerce and all its instrumentalities is supreme; and, as that power has been exerted,
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state laws have no application. They cannot be applied
in coincidence with, as complementary to or as in opposition
to, federal enactments which disclose the intention of Congress to enter a field of regulation that is within its jurisdiction."

35

The result achieved by this exhibition of main strength in
filling statutory gaps is no doubt a desirable addition to the uniformity of the law applicable to carriage which extends outside
any particular state. Presumably the decision of the Texas
court in Wolff and Co. v. Missouri, Kansas and Texas Ry.,a0
is affected by it though the difference in the haul is a possible
basis for distinction.
On the more direct phases of control in the interacting areas
of state and federal authority there have been lately a number of
decisions which illustrate that tightening of the web of Federal
regulation, which the logic of the new view of the railroads imposes, and which the situation, in itself, requires. The formula
which dominates the field is well known. It was restated in Di
3
Santo v. Commission of Pennsylvania,
7 which reversed a conviction, in the Pennsylvania courts, for violating a state law
requiring the sellers of steamship tickets or orders for transportation to or from foreign countries to be licensed. Mr. Justice
Butler, for the court, disposed of the case in a paragraph, saying:
"The soliciting of passengers and the sale of steamship tickets and orders for passage between the United
'The case is noted (1927) 25 MIcH. L. Rxv. 9o2, and characterized as
judicial legislation. It is also noted in (1927) 40 HARv. L. REv. 1130-5, "For-

eign Commerce and the Interstate Commerce Act." So far as judicial legislation goes the court had already in Galveston, etc., Ry. v. Woodbury, 257 U. S.
357 (192o) applied the "from United States to an adjacent country" provision
of the act to a haul from the adjacent country to the United States, in sustaining a limitation of baggage liability.
"Supra note 31.
37273 U. S. 34 (1927).
The case is noted (1927) 27 Col. L. REv. 573,
The "Direct Burden" Test of the Constitutionality of State Statutes Affecting
Interstate Commerce; (1927) 22 Ir. L. REv. 197; (1927) 5 N. C. L. REv. 318;
(1927) 5 TEx. L. REv. 318. In The Silence of Congress, (1928) 41 HARV. L.
Ray. 2oo, Mr. Henry Wolf Bikle discusses some of the inconsistencies which
appear in the principles as announced by the court.
In a note on the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission E. F. Albertsworth deals with the question "What is interstate commerce?" generally, in
(1927)

22 ILL. L. RE~v. 304.

He says delimitation is not possible.
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States and Europe constitute a well-recognized part of foreign commerce. . . . A state statute which by its neces-

sary operation directly interferes with or burdens foreign
commerce is a prohibited regulation and invalid regardless
of the purpose with which it was passed.

.

.

. Such legis-

lation cannot be sustained as an exertion of the police power
of the state to prevent possible fraud.

.

.

.

The Congress

has complete and paramount authority to regulate foreign
commerce and, by appropriate measures, to protect the public against frauds of those who sell these tickets and orders.
The sales here in question are related to foreign commerce
as directly as are sales made in ticket offices maintained by
the carriers and operated by their servants and employees.
The license fee and other things imposed by the act on plaintiff-in-error, who initiates for his principals a transaction
in foreign commerce, constitute a direct burden on that commerce."
Justices Brandeis and Holmes dissented, the former saying:
"The fact that the sale of the ticket is made as a part
of a transaction in foreign or interstate commerce does not
preclude application of state inspection laws, where, as here,
Congress has not entered the field, and the state regulation
neither obstructs, discriminates against, nor directly burdens the commerce."
And he recites in brief the facts and holdings of twentyfive to thirty cases on the topic, concluding:
"In the search for truth through the slow process of
inclusion and exclusion, involving trial and error, it behooves us to reject, as guides, the decisions upon such questions which prove to have been mistaken. This course seems
to me imperative when, as here, the decision to be made involves the delicate adjustment of conflicting claims of the
federal government and the states to regulate commerce.
The many cases on the commerce clause in which this court
has overruled or explained away its earlier decisions show
that the wisdom of this course has been heretofore recognized. In the case at bar, also, the logic of words should
yield to the logic of realities."
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Mr. Justice Stone who also dissented said:
"In this case the traditional test of the limit of state
action by inquiring whether the interference with commerce
is direct or indirect seems to me too mechanical, too uncertain in its application, and too remote from actualities, to
be of value. In thus making use of the expressions 'direct'
and 'indirect interference' with commerce, we are doing little more than using labels to describe a result rather than any
trustworthy formula by which it is- reached.
"It is difficult to say that such permitted interferences
as those enumerated in Mr. Justice Brandeis' opinion are
less direct than the interference prohibited here. But it
seems clear that those interferences not deemed forbidden
are to be sustained; not because the effect on commerce is
nominally indirect, but because a consideration of all the
facts and circumstances, such as the nature of the regulation, its function, the character of the business involved and
the actual effect on the flow of commerce, lead to the conclusion that the regulation concerns interests peculiarly local
and does not infringe the national interest in maintaining
the freedom of commerce across state lines.
"I am not persuaded that the regulation here is more
than local in character. Until Congress undertakes the protection of local communities from the dishonesty of the sellers of steamship tickets, it would seem that there is no adequate ground for holding that the regulation here involved
is a prohibited interference with commerce."
After such judicial remarks as these the commentator recalls the reply of Dr. Johnson to Boswell's question about supporting a bad case. "Sir, you do not know it to be good or bad
till the Judge determine it." Predictability and client advising
become impossible. Yet the blessing of the open concept may
outweigh these detriments and leave criticism to deal with results
merely.
The last sentences quoted from the two dissenting opinions
serve to point out the unfortunate character of the decision under
the present circumstances. The needs, which the justices from
the great seaboard sensed, plus the fact that Congress was not in
the field and could by entering it oust any state which already
had entered it, make the case apparently an example of a merely

REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES

blind urge toward Federal control rather than a factually justifiable thing, since chinking a gap with Federal authority in the
abstract, when actual exercise of Federal authority was lacking,
operated to leave an open gap uncovered by any atithority at all.
Accepting the hypothesis of a need, the decision holds a direct
invitation to Congress to "do something." But if the case had
gone the way of the dissenters, the state authority could no doubt
have handled the situation effectively if temporarily.
The case of the Ptiblic Utilities Commission of Rhode Island
v. Attleboro .Steam and Electric Co.,8 8 is another direct invita-

tion to Congress to do something in an instance where, however,
the effectiveness of state action is more than doubtful. Briefly,
the facts are that the Narragansett Electric Light Co., a Rhode
Island corporation, generated, in Rhode Island, -current which it
sold in part 89 to the Attleboro Company which retailed it in its
Massachusetts city to its local consumers. The arrangement
dated from 1917 and was expressed in figures, appropriate to its
date, but rendered highly unpalateable to the Narragansett Company by post-war conditions. The latter therefore made application for an increase of rates. A commission is not barred from
increasing them, 40 but the problem of the Narragansett Co. was
"Which commission?" The point of the case is whether its
guess of the Rhode Island Commission was a good one. The
commission itself took jurisdiction but the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that its order granting the increase imposed
a direct burden on interstate commerce 41 and directed that the
proceedings be dismissed. This the Federal Supreme Court
"273 U. S. 83 (927).

The part was only 1/35th of the total. As bearing on the question
whether the matter was "local" within the jargon of the subject, more attention might have been given to the smallness of the part.
" The contract is no bar to an increase of rates. "The power of the state to
regulate the selling price is not affected by the fact that the supply is furnished
under a long term contract. Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia Public Service
Corporation, 248 U. S. 372 (igg," remarked the court.
"It acted on the authority of Missouri v.. Kansas Gas Co., 265 U. S. 298
(1924), which is stated in the abstract of the opinion of Mr. Justice Sanford.
See Dwight Williams, The Power of the State to Control the Use of Natural
Resources, (1927) I1 MiNN. L. Rav. 129, 233, 243. If a state wishes to build up
industry within its borders by limiting its power exports as the local commission may decide, does the Attleboro case bar its indulgence in the policy?
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agreed with, Mr. Justice Sanford writing for the Court and Mr.
Justice Brandeis dissenting.
Said Sanford, J:
"It is conceded rightly, that the sale of electric current by the Narragansett Company to the Attleboro Company is a transaction in interstate commerce, notwithstanding the fact that the current is delivered at the state line. The
transmission of electric current from one state to another,
like that of gas, is interstate commerce. Coal & Coke Co. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm., 84 W. Va. 662, 669, and its essential
character is not affected by a passing of custody and title
at the state boundary not arresting the continuous transmission to the intended destination. People's Gas Co. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm., 270 U. S. 550 (1926).

"The petitioners contend, however, that the Rhode
Island Commission cannot effectively exercise its power to
regulate the rates for electricity furnished by the Narragansett Company to local [Rhode Island] consumers, without
also regulating the rates for the other service which it furnishes; that if the Narragansett Company continues to furnish electricity to the Attleboro Company at a loss, this will
tend to increase the burden on the local consumers and impair the ability of the Narragansett Company to give them
good service at reasonable prices; and that, therefore, the
order of the Commission prescribing a reasonable rate for
the interstate service to the Attleboro Company should be
sustained as being essentially a local regulation, necessary
to the protection of matters of local interest, and affecting
interstate commerce only indirectly and incidentally. In support of this, contention they rely chiefly upon Pennsylvania
Gas Co. v. Pub. Serv. CoM., 252 U. S. 23 (I92o) ; and the

controlling question presented is whether the present case
comes within the rule of the Pennsylvania Gas Co. case or
that of the Kansas Gas Co. case upon which the Attleboro
Company relies.
"In the Pennsylvania Gas Co. case, the company transmitted natural gas by a main pipe line from the source of
supply in Pennsylvania to a point of distribution in a city
in New York, which it there subdivided and sold at retail
to local consumers supplied from the main by pipes laid
through the streets of the city. In holding that the New
York Public Service Commission might regulate the rate
charged to these consumers, the court said that while a state
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may not 'directly' regulate or burden interstate commerce,
it may in some instances, until the subject-matter is regulated by Congress, pass laws, 'indirectly' affecting such commerce, when needed to protect or regulate matters of local
interest; that the thing which the New York Commission
had undertaken to regulate, while part of an interstate transmission, was 'local in its nature,' pertaining to the furnishing of gas to local consumers, and the service rendered to
them was 'essentially local' being similar to that of a local
plant furnishing gas to consumers in a city; and that such
'local service' was not of the character which required general and uniform regulation of rates by congressional action,
even if the local rates might 'affect' the interstate business
of the company.
"In the Kansas Gas Co. case the company, whose business was principally interstate, transported natural gas by
continuous pipe lines from wells in Oklahoma and Kansas
into Missouri, and there sold and delivered it to distributing companies, which then sold and delivered it to local consumers. In holding that the rate which the company
charged for the gas sold to the distributing companiesthose at which these companies sold to the local consumers
not being involved-was not subject to regulation by the
Public Utilities Commission of Missouri, the court said that,
while in the absence of congressional action a state may
generally enact laws of internal police, although they have
an indirect effect upon interstate commerce, 'the commerce
clause of the Constitution, of its own force, restrains the
states from imposing direct burdens upon interstate commerce,' and a state enactment imposing such a 'direct burden' must fall, being a direct restraint of that which in the
absence of federal regulation should be free, Minnesota
Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352 (1913); that the sale and deliv-

ery to the distributing companies was 'an inseparable part
of a transaction in interstate commerce-not local but essentially national in character-and enforcement of a selling
price in such a transaction places a direct burden upon such
commerce inconsistent with that freedom of interstate trade
which it was the purpose of the commerce clause to secure
and preserve'; that in the Pennsylvania Gas Co. case the
decision rested on the ground that the service to the consumers for which the regulated charge was made, was 'essentially local' and the things done were after the business
in its essentially national aspect had come to an end-that
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supplying of local consumers being 'a local business,' even
though the gas be brought from another state, in which
the local interest is paramount and the interference with
interstate commerce, if any, indirect and of minor importance; but that in the sale of gas in wholesale quantities not
to consumers, but to distributing companies for resale to
consumers, where the transportation, sale and delivery constitutes an unbroken chain, fundamentally interstate from
beginning to end, 'the paramount interest is not local but
national, admitting of and requiring uniformity of regulation,' which, 'even though it be the uniformity of governmental nonaction, may be highly necessary to preserve
equality of opportunity and treatment among the various
communities and states concerned.'
"It is clear that the present case is controlled by the
Kansas Gas Co. case. . . . It is immaterial that the Narragansett Company is a Rhode Island corporation subject
to regulation by the Commission in its local business, or
that Rhode Island is the state from which the electric current is transmitted in interstate commerce, and not that in
which it is received, as in the Kansas Gas Co. case. The
forwarding state obviously has no more authority than the
receiving state to place a direct burden upon interstate commerce. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553
(1923). Nor is it material that the general business of the
Narragansett Company appears to be chiefly local, while
in the Kansas Gas Co. case the company was principally
engaged in interstate business. The test of the validity of a
state regulation is not the character of the general business
of the company, but whether the particular business which
is regulated is essentially local or national in character; and
if the regulation places a direct burden upon its interstate
business it is none the less beyond the power of the state
because this may be the smaller part of its general business.
Furthermore, if Rhode Island could place a direct burden
upon the interstate business of the Narragansett Company
because this would result in indirect benefit to the customers
of the Narragansett Company in Rhode Island, Massachusetts could, by parity of reasoning, reduce the rates on such
interstate business in order to benefit the customers of the
Attleboro Company in that state, who would have, in the
aggregate, an interest in the interstate rate co-relative to
that of the customers of the Narragansett Company in
Rhode Island. Plainly, however, the paramount interest in
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the interstate business carried on between the two companies
is not local to either state, but is essentially national in character. The rate is therefore not subject to regulation by
either of the two states in the guise of protection to the respective local interests but, if such regulation is required it
can only be attained by the exercise of the power vested
in Congress. See Covington Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154
U. S. 204 (1894) ; Hanley v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 187
U. S. 617 (19o3)."42

If the Attleboro users of the electricity retailed to them by
the Attleboro Company felt that their rates were too high, they
would, naturally, apply to the Massachusetts Commission for
relief; and under the Pennsylvania Gas case doctrine the Massachusetts Commission has jurisdiction to give it. If, however, the
major item in the Attleboro Company's cost is-as it probably
is-the price of the imported current, and that price under the
contract is-as it may become if price levels drop-too high; what
practical handling of the situation can the Massachusetts Commission make?
The moral, for the present, seems to be for the consumer to
contract with an out of the state utility if he can. In anothtr
aspect the decision frowns upon a policy on the part of a powerproducing state, to build up industry within its borders by having its commission allot and limit the amount of current export
allowed, a matter much agitated in Maine. 43 As a phase of the
trend toward unity, it seems a desirable propulsion of Federal
€'The case was variously noted in the current law reviews: (1927) 27 COLL. REv. 615; (1927) 15 GEoRGErow L. REV. 346; (927) 4o HARV. L. REV.
9o6; (1927) 22 ILT.L. REv. 197; (1927) 26 Micr. L. REv. io6; (1927) 36
YALE L. J. 881.
'Brandeis, J. (dissenting) : "If the (Rhode Island) Commission lacks the
power exercised it is solely because the electricity is delivered for use in another
state. That fact makes the transaction interstate commerce, and Congress has
power to legislate on the subject. It has not done so, nor has it legislated on
any allied subject, so there can be no contention that it has occupied the field.
Nor is this a case in which it can be said that the silence of Congress is a command that the Rhode Island utility shall remain free to discriminate against the
citizens of the state by which it was incorporated and in which it does business.
That state may not, of course, obstruct or directly burden interstate commerce.
But to prevent discrimination in the price of electricity wherever used does not
obstruct or place a direct burden upon interstate commerce." Governor Brewster
of Maine in various recent speeches has dealt with the export or non-export by
his state of hydroelectric power: See editorial, "Maine's Water Power," Boston
Herald, Sept. i9,1927.
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regulation into a field in which its unified control is demanded
by the facts. The plans for superpower systems of vast scope
and area, co-ordinating the use of current from water power and
from coal burned at the mine, can presumably flower best under
single supervision and function better under single regulationassuming regulation inevitable. The hitches in the realization of
the Colorado River Water Compact leave the writer voting for
a unity under Federal control. If the Secretary of Agriculture
can function as a commission in Stockyard regulation 44 no
doubt some agency, perhaps the Federal Power Commission,
can be revamped to function similarly here, but if the electrification of the railroads should follow upon the realization of the
superpower scheme it might prove as undesirable that the Commerce Commission did not control the railroad power factor, as
it is that the railroad wage factor is now in other hands.
" Packers' Act,

1921, supra note 27.

(To be concluded)

